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Abstract 
Data encryption plays a crucial role in postmodern society. As technology continues to advance, 
the current predominate system, RSA cryptography, will fail to maintain the safety of 
information. Thus, corporations, governments, and individuals alike must turn towards a 
different alternative. I discuss how the security of data is related to the mathematical properties 
of finite fields. Throughout the discussion, mathematical examples are demonstrated using 
programs in Mathematica code. First, error-correcting codes are presented and analyzed to 
demonstrate how miscommunications can effectively and efficiently be prevented. Second, the 
mathematical structure ofElGamal and elliptic curve cryptography is explained. Lastly, all 
presented cryptosystems are analyzed for their level of security and implementation. 
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Process Analysis Statement 
In this paper, I explore the mathematics of finite fields and cryptography. To fully 
understand how computations within finite fields behave and how finite fields are structured, I 
first work with error-correcting codes. In this, I am able to build a working knowledge of 
field-generating elements, irreducible polynomials, field extensions, and order, all of which are 
necessary to grasp the later cryptosystem presentations. Error-correcting codes allow messages, 
consisting of encrypted data or plain text, to be transmitted without communication error or 
failure. All ofthe work in creating secure cryptosystems is useless if the crafted messages are 
received with irreversible errors. Data transmission is a direct application of mathematics to the 
real world. Thus, it is important to demonstrate how it can be practically implemented, and I do 
this in the form of Mathematica code. Most of the material of this section of the paper comes 
from weekly studies of the book Algebraic Coding Theory and guidance from my advisor, 
Hanspeter Fischer. 
Once the groundwork for comprehending cryptosystems is set, I can mathematically 
present EIGamal and elliptic curve cryptography both through theory and programs in 
Mathematica. The programs reveal that the stated theory works as I claim that it does. Along 
with guidance from Hanspeter Fischer, I discovered material in Algebraic Aspects of 
Cryptography and theories from various mathematicians' published articles. Further, I draw 
conclusions from the research and mathematical theory and discuss how their implications 
prevent the world from falling victim to data breaches in the future. 
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I. Introduction 
In a postmodern society, technology is king. Everyday tasks and transactions rely on its 
efficiency and security. If either of these fundamental qualities, efficiency or security, are lost, 
then entire portions of society's foundation will suffer. Imagine not being able to quickly and 
safely purchase a product online, send electronic messages, or use paperless billing. Beyond 
avoiding inconveniences, individuals' identities have been translated into bundles of zeros and 
ones, easy to work with yet easy to exploit. If a person ' s social security number, credit card 
number, or email password becomes public, they are susceptible to losing everything they had 
earned and saved. Therefore, it is crucial that large corporations and individuals alike ensure that 
their data is protected. For most ofpostmodern history, the standard procedure for providing 
such security has been through employing an RSA encryption scheme. 
The RSA scheme, named after its creators Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman, exploits the 
mathematical property that there is no discovered algorithm to factor large numbers in a 
time-efficient manner [17] . Factorization, breaking down numbers into their prime divisors, is 
not a complex mathematical concept; however, incredible amounts of successive simple 
computations are not feasible to conduct in a setting where encryption and decryption are 
performed seemingly in an instant. The mathematical structure of the RSA cryptosystem follows. 
To begin the encryption process, one party chooses two large prime numbers, p and q, 
and multiplies them together to create the product n = pq . They then compute the totient, a 
product defined by the formula <t> = (p- l)(q- 1). From there, one positive number, e, is chosen 
such that e is less than the totient and bears no common factors with the totient, namely 
1 :::; e < <P and GCD(e, <P) = 1. Once e is chosen, its multiplicative inverse modulo <P can be 
calculated call it d. In this, ed = qcp + 1 for some integer <P . From these computations, a public 
and private key for the RSA system can be constructed. The set of numbers (n,e) is the public 
key that will be shared with any party wanting to communicate, and the set of numbers (n,d) is 
the private key that the original party keeps secret. 
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For example, suppose Noah wants to send a message Mto Ella. He first needs to raise the 
message Mto the power e mod n from Ella's public key. This needs to be done using a fast 
modular exponentiation algorithm called PowerMod, since in practice the exponent is several 
hundred digits long. For a construction of such an algorithm, see section II. The result will be the 
encrypted message that is sent to Ella. Once transmitted, it is up to Ella to obtain the original 
message using her private key. She can raise the encrypted message to the power d mod n from 
her private key, which will result in the correct message that Noah sent. An example of a 
standard transfer using Mathematica code is as follows. 
RSA Transfer 
First, define p and q as two distinct prime numbers of roughly the same size. 
p = NextPrime [31. 7 892 330] 
q = NextPrime [ 432 590 000] 
3 17892343 
432590029 
totient = (p- 1.) * (q- 1.) 
137 517 05 7 126 765 576 
Let e be the chosen public key element that is relatively prime to the totient. 
e = 1. 398 240 093 871.; 
GCD[e, totient] 
1 
d = PowerMod[e, -1., totient] 
134 700 056 0 1 8 529 031 
Let M be the intended information message. 
M = 938 049 830 952; 
Encrypted= PowerMod[M, e, n] 
18 343125 216 612 758 
Let Encrypted be the communicated message. 
PowerMod[Encrypted, d, n] 
938 04 9 830 952 
M == PowerMod[Encrypted, d, n] 
True 
Thus, the inteded informaton message is equal to the decrypted message, and the transfer is 
successful. 
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The decryption is successful since e and d were designed to. be multiplicative inverses of 
one another modulo <P such that CMd = (Me)d = Med = Mqq>+l = M 1 = M mod n. The latter 
follows because xp- 1 = 1 mod pfor all x that do not divide p, and likewise for q. Thus, the 
security of information transfers within the RSA system rests in the mathematical phenomenon 
that the public cannot factor the large number n to obtain the private key element d. 
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If a factoring algorithm is discovered, then all data that is currently protected by the RSA 
system could be released from its protection. Mathematicians have not yet proven if such a 
factoring algorithm exists. Even without a known factoring algorithm, the security of RSA has 
been challenged throughout its history. In recent decades, the computational speed of technology 
has drastically increased. According to the Federal Information Processing Standards, the 
modulus n should be of size 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits [9]. While having a larger modulus may 
appear to always be the optimal choice, larger moduli are more costly to implement because of 
lost time efficiency and the necessity for more powerful technology. Recently, encoders are 
transitioning into favoring 2048 bits over 1 024 bits out of fear that the computing power of 
technology will soon surpass the time obstacle of factoring a number of size 1024 bits. If 
companies and corporations fail to update their private key alongside the advancement of 
technology, then their security ~ystem is breachable. The consequence of neglecting to enlarge 
private keys is evident in the case of the French credit card company, Carte Bleue. In 2000, 33 
million credit card numbers were compromised due to the failure of a 320 bit modulus [17]. 
More recently, a flaw in the security chips of Estonia' s national identification cards resulted in 
760,000 people being banned from accessing online government services. To protect national 
security, the affected people were required to update the digital information of their cards in 
order to regain access to the government services [21]. 
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While breaching an RSA system through vast computational power in a "brute force" 
manner is possible, attacks have been designed to take advantage of possible weak points in a 
system's mathematical structure. I discuss a few such attacks that I have learned about from both 
external resources and my previous Number Theory class, MATH 416. In order to make 
encryption and decryption processes more time efficient, companies may choose to set the 
private key element d to be relatively small in value when compared to the modulus n. While 
increasing computational speeds as much as tenfold when using smaller exponent d can be seen 
as beneficial, a theorem by mathematician M. Wiener proves that the private key can be 
discovered if d < tn* where n = pq and q < p < 2q [4]. In other words, the increased speed of a 
private element satisfying a particular relationship with the modulus is at the cost of the 
system' s security. Similarly, a party may set their public exponent e to be relatively small. While 
attacks in this context are not as destructive as the M. Wiener attack, the most powerful attack, 
attributed to mathematician Coppersmith, has the potential to quickly discover all the roots of a 
function/modulus n that satisfy a constraint. In particular, roots can be found when they are less 
than X= n~-E wherefis a monic polynomial with integer coefficients of degree d and £ is some 
non-negative integer. With that information then, the attacker has more insight into what the 
correct d must be [ 4]. More advanced attacks and hacking techniques will inevitably arise in the 
future given more time and computing power. 
Recent advancements in quantum technology suggest that the factorization barrier will 
soon be breachable. What once would take an unreasonable amount of time to compute would be 
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executed almost instantaneously, and RSA encryption would be rendered useless. In 1994 a 
mathematician named Peter Shor created an algorithm that is able to efficiently factor large 
numbers given that quantum bits are used rather than the traditional binary digits. In binary, the 
bits of data have an overall value of either one or zero: 00,01 ,1 0, and 11. However, in quantum 
computing, the bits, termed qubits, can hold a value of both one and zero: 00+ 11 , 00-11 , 01 + 10 
or 0 1-l 0 [7]. The simultaneous value of one and zero, termed superposition allows for two 
different computations to be completed at the same time. This parallel computation allows for 
algorithms to be executed with unmatched efficiency. The mathematician Chuang has developed 
a quantum system that has the ability to parallel-wise compute Shor' s algorithm, and in turn, 
factor numbers. While fifteen is the largest number that has been successfully factored in this 
manner, completed with only five qubits versus the twelve required previously, the system's 
structure has the potential to be expanded upon [20]. It is important to note, however, that not all 
mathematicians believe that quantum computing will destroy RSA encryption. 
A group of mathematicians working out of the University of Chicago has proposed that 
traditional RSA cryptography can be adapted for "post-quantum" cryptography. They suggest 
that quantum computations can be utilized not only to decrypt, but also to encrypt information to 
such a degree that the cost of decrypting it is impractical. While their conclusion is proven 
theoretically true, a sufficient security system in their presented model requires a modulus n that 
is one terabyte in size and has 4096-bit primes [2]. Even though the potential attacker is shown to 
have a quadratic increase in cost for decryption over the intended party, the resources required to 
operate with a terabyte-sized key make their statements more theoretical than applicable to 
real-world information security. With Chuang's recent discoveries and the recent pace of the 
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technology industry, it appears that the breakthrough into post-quantum computing is imminent. 
Hence, there needs to be another system that can encrypt information reasonably beyond the 
grasp of quantum computing. I discuss how the future of data security may rest in the 
mathematical properties of finite fields and elliptic curves. I will first explore error detection and 
correction in finite fields and work into the mathematics that define elliptic curve cryptography. I 
will present how finite field computations and alternative encryption methods can be 
implemented. 
II. Error-Correcting Codes 
Like any aspect of the real world, technology is imperfect. Not all transmitted 
information is received with the intended message intact; data can get lost or altered in transition. 
One switch of a digit can result in a drastic miscommunication or communication failure. 
Therefore, a successful information transfer needs protection against possible errors occurring 
within transmission. The mathematical properties of finite fields allow for such termed 
error-correcting codes. While this seems like an abstract concept, its implications are evident in 
real-world application. Consider how an entire barcode is not needed for an item to be scanned 
correctly or how QR codes are able to relay information even if they are not captured perfectly. 
Error-correcting codes are written in a manner that guarantees the original message is received 
given a certain amount of accurate data is present despite a predicted amount of missing data or 
errors. In general, as a code ' s strength of error correction increases, the transmission speed 
decreases. Therefore, it is up to the encoder to consider the content matter of the messages and 
determine the balance between the code 's capacity and efficiency. 
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a.) Simple Binary Error-Correcting Codes 
Simple binary error-correcting codes have the ability to correct substitution errors within 
a message. That is, they are able to identify if and where a digit has been changed. Because the 
only possible digits in binary codes are 1 and 0, the located erroneous digits can simply be 
switched to the their opposing value. Thus, even though the codes are termed "error-correcting", 
binary codes need only locate errors. To correct possible errors, redundancy is added into the 
code such that variant messages continue to resemble the intended messages enough for them to 
be accurately interpreted. Just as the human brain can reason through misspelled words, the 
addition of redundancy allows computers to make sense out of flawed information. For simple 
binary error-correcting codes, the redundancy is added in the form of parity check digits. Parity 
check digits are extra digits added to the message along with the desired data that provide 
computers with the information they need to make sense out of the "misspelling". The check 
digits are not added randomly. Rather, they are calculated using either matrix or polynomial 
operations as discussed in later sections. 
In general, a message with n many total digits and r many check digits has k = n- r 
many information digits. Thus, the resultant binary code has 2k many k length codewords that 
can be successfully transmitted. The encoder is able to manipulate the number of possible 
codewords that can be generated and alter the information rate of the transmission by adjusting R 
when R = ! . While increasing redundancy through the addition of check digits increases the 
n . 
reliability of error detection, it also decreases the information rateR, namely the proportion 
! = u;;i . For example, if an encoder wants the ability to send 512 unique chunks of information, 
n n 
their code will require 512 = 29 many unique codewords. Thus, their messages will have a 
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length of nine digits. Suppose that the same encoder chooses to add three check digits to instead 
have messages of length n = 9 + 3 = 12. Then, out of the possible 2 12 messages that can be 
constructed, 29 will be codewords such that 1dcJ-6 = 12.5% of the possible messages are the 
intended pieces of information. Encoders would like the probability that transmission errors 
transform one correct codeword into a different correct codeword to be low, since that 
phenomenon would result in a miscommunication error. In the presented example, the code is 
100- 12.5 = 87.5% reliable with a transmission speed of R= * = 192 • If an encoder is unhappy 
with the level of reliability, redundancy can be increased by adding more check digits; however, 
they have to accept a lower transmission rate. If instead the encoder chooses to add six check 
digits, then 3~~~8 = 1.5625 % of the possible message are codewords, and the code is 
100- 1.5625 = 98.4375% reliable with an information rate of R= * = {5 . 
If an encoder has reason to believe that the probability of an error occurring within a 
specific channel is some £ such that 0 < £ < 1 , then for every 100 sent messages, £many errors 
can be assumed to have occurred. Since the codes can be adapted for specified channels, simple 
binary error-correcting codes are highly beneficial when sending information through channels 
that have approximately known rates of random error occurrence. Once the desired balance 
between reliability and speed of transmission has been determined, the encoder is capable of 
constructing an appropriate code for the information. 
b.) Single-Error Hamming Codes 
In 1950, the mathematician Hamming published the first theory on linear codes defined 
by matrices [1 0] . Such linear codes are now termed Hamming codes. By definition, a code is 
linear if and only if its codewords are the set of vectors C satisfying the equation YJC1 = 0 for a 
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matrix 11· In particular, the code length n is equal to the number of columns of the matrix 11 [1]. 
Hamming's theory provided the groundwork for coding theory and quickly spurred other 
mathematicians to expand upon his findings. His theory states that Hamming codes have the 
capability of correcting all possibilities of a single error if and only if all the columns of the 
associated matrix are distinct and not equal to zero [ 1]. The associated Hamming matrix 
described in Berlekamp' s Theorem 1.3 can be constructed by introducing a finite field of 
characteristic two and letting the matrix columns represent increasing powers of a 
field-generating element a. In this manner, the first column represents a0 = 1 ---jo { 1, 0, 0, 0} , 
and the second column represents a 1 = a = { 0, 1, 0, 0} . 
Suppose Noah wants to send Ella a message with n digits and anticipates that one error 
will occur. He first needs to define a binary finite field of order n and choose a field generating 
element to construct the code' s associated matrix. Once the matrix is set, he can determine the 
code's information capacity by finding a basis for the kernel of the associated matrix. The 
resultant dimension ofthe kernel is equal to the number of information digits in which Noah can 
form a codeword. He next needs to multiply his codeword by the transpose of the kernel matrix 
in order to add the check digits that will correctly generate the full message. With all n digits in 
place, Noah can send the message to Ella. By construction, Ella is able to run the message 
through the Hamming code's associated matrix via matrix multiplication to check for an error. 
She first computes what is called the syndrome by taking the product of the Hamming matrix and 
the received message. Since Noah designed the codeword to be a linear combination of the 
kernel basis vectors, the codeword is in the kernel of the matrix itself. Hence, if the syndrome is 
the zero element {0,0,0,0} , then she assumes that the received message is correct. This is where 
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the code's measure of reliability becomes important. If the error transformed the message into a 
different unintended codeword, then Ella will misinterpret Noah's message. If instead the 
syndrome is nonzero, then she knows an error occurred. In particular, she knows that the error is 
located in the position of the message that corresponds with the column of the Hamming code 
that matches the syndrome. This is because when the received message is ran through the 
coding matrix, only the error pattern will result in a non zero output. To demonstrate the 
communication' s mathematical structure, a transfer using Mathematica code follows . Additional 
messages are considered in order to fully demonstrate the procedure. Suppose the messages are 
of length n= 15, and the finite field is defined by the field extension over the finite field Z2 by a 
root of the irreducible polynomial 1 + x3 + .0 . 
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Consider the finite field extension over Z 2 by a root of the irreducible polynomial I +x3+x4=m(x) 
First, it is necessary to ensure that m(x) is an irreducible polynomial mod 2. All irreducibles in a field of 
size 24 - 1 necessarily divide x2•-1 =x15 - 1, and the table below shows that m(x) is one such irreducible. 
TableForm[ {Map [First, FactorList [x" 15- 1, Modulus-+ 2]]}] 
1 1+x 1 + x + x 2 
Using the finite fields package, define the chosen extension,GabField, as follows: 
<< FiniteFields · 
GabField = GF[2, {1, 0, 0, 1, 1}] ; 
Fieldirreducible[GabField, x] 
Let Minimala be the minimal polynomial of the element a . 
Minimal a = 1 + x" 3 + x" 4 ; 
a = GabField [ { 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} ] ; 
TableForm[ {Map [First, FactorList [x" 15- 1, Modulus-+ 2]], 
Map[First, FactorList[x"15 -1 , Modulus-+ 2]] I . x-+ a}] 
1 
1 
1+x 
{1 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
1 + x + x 2 1 + x + x 4 
{1 , 1 , 1 , O}z {0 , 1 , 0 , 1}z {0 , 1 , 1 , 0} 2 
The above table demonstrates that a is in fact a root of the chosen field irreducible. Further, the table 
below confirms that a is a field-generating element. 
MatrixForm[Table[a"i, {i, 0, 14}]] 
1 
{ 0 , 1 , 0 , O}z 
{ 0 , 0 , 1 , 0} 2 
{0 , 0 , 0, 1}z 
{ 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 }z 
{ 1 , 1 , 0 , 1} z 
{ 1 , 1 , 1 , 1} z 
{ 1 , 1 , 1 , 0} 2 
{ 0 , 1 , 1 , 1} z 
{ 1, 0 , 1, O}z 
{ 0 , 1 , 0, 1 }z 
{1, 0 , 1, 1 }z 
{ 1 , 1 , 0 , O}z 
{0 , 1 , 1 , O} z 
{0 , 0 , 1, 1 }z 
Example1 is the manual construction of the matrix from the succesive powers of a . 
Example1 = { { 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0} , 
{0 , 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0}, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1} , {0 , 0, 0, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1}} ; 
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Let SingleHamming be the associated Hamming matrix. 
Si.ngl.eHanuning = Matri.xForm [Exampl.e1] 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Define SingleHammingCode as the kernel of the Hamming matrix SingleHamming. 
Si.ngleHammi.ngCode = Reverse [Mod [NullSpace [Example1] 1 2] ] ; 
Matri.xForm[Si.ngl.eHammi.ngCode] 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Let M be the chosen information digits. The constructed codeword, defined Correct, is precisely the 
message M with the necessary 4 check digits added to the front. 
M= {0 1 0, 1 1 0 , 1, 1 1 0, 0 1 1 1 0 1 1} ; 
Correct = Mod [(Transpose [Si.ngl eHanuni.ngCode] . M), 2 ] 
{1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 01 0 1 1 1 0 1 1} 
Suppose an error occurs during transmission such that the digit in position two of the message switches 
value. 
Recei. ved : { 1 1 Q 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 } 
{1 1 0 1 01 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1, 01 0 1 11 0 1 1} 
Syndrome= Mod[Exampl.e1 . Recei.v e d , 2 ] 
{0 1 1 1 0 1 0} 
The syndrome matches the second column of SingleHamming as desired since the error was designed 
to have occured in the second position of the transmitted message. 
Consider other messages 
M2 = {1 1 0, 1, 11 1111 0 , 0 1 110 , 1} ; 
Corr ect2 =Mod[ (Tr anspose[Si.ngleHammi.ngCode] . M2) 1 2] 
{11 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 o, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 01 0 1 1 1 0 1 1} 
Recei. Ve d 2 1 : { 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 } ; 
Syndrome2 = Mod [Example! . Recei ved2 1 2] 
{0 1 1 1 1 1 0} 
The syndrome matches the fourteenth column of SingleHamming as desired since the error was 
designed to have occured in the fourteenth position of the transmitted message. 
M3 = {0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0}; 
Correct3 =Mod[ (Transpose[SingleHammingCode) . M3) 1 2] 
{1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0} 
Recei ved3 = { l1 0 I 0 I 0 1 0 I 0 I Q I l 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 0 } ; 
Syndrome3 = Mod [Example! . Recei ved3 1 2] 
{1 1 1 1 1 1 1 } 
15 
The syndrome matches the seventh column of SingleHamming as desired since the error was designed 
to have occured in the seventh position of the transmitted message. 
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In the presented example, the syndrome matches the second column of the Hamming 
matrix. Hence, the error happened in position two of the received message as designed. This 
matching method works because matrix multiplication operates on the individual entries of the 
messages in successive order. Thus, a switched digit in a particular position of a word results in a 
change in the output matrix each time matrix multiplication operates on that position in the 
matrix. Notice, however, that two errors in the message would result in a decoding failure since 
the addition of two ones is equal to zero in binary. While Hamming codes of this form are 
effective at correcting a single error, they fail at correcting any additional errors. 
c) Double-Error Hamming Codes 
In 1960, soon after the initial publication, Hamming's findings were generalized in order 
to detect more than one error by mathematicians Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem [ 1]. 
The termed BCH codes show that by employing a simple modification of the single-error 
correcting Hamming code, two errors can be successfully corrected. Similar to how the single 
error Hamming matrix represents increasing powers of field-generating element u , increasing 
powers of u3 are expressed successively and added to the associated Hamming matrix beneath 
the rows dedicated to u . This adaptation creates a matrix that has twice the number of rows as 
the single error-correcting matrix, and as one may expect, the new matrix has the capability of 
correcting twice as many errors. It is important to note that u3 is used instead of u2 since the 
syndrome corresponding to u2n is the square of the syndrome corresponding to un within a 
binary context. Just as in the case of single error-correction, the codewords are designed to be in 
the kernel of the code matrix. However, a nonzero syndrome of a received message now has two 
parts, the first and second half of the digits, Sl and S3 respectively. The mathematician 
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Berlekamp uses a quadratic equation, out of the calculated Sl and S3 such that the equation's 
roots are the reciprocal locations of the errors [ 1, p. 19]. While Berlekamp is accredited for 
constructing an efficient algorithm and formula for more than one error correction, the correction 
of multiple errors was proven theoretically possible by Bose and Ray-Chaudhuri in 1960. For the 
full mathematical argument, see reference [6]. Since computations are executed within the base 
field Z2, squaring is a linear operation. Thus, the solutions can be found through a series of 
matrix operations. Once the roots are calculated, their inverses match the specific columns of the 
code matrix where the error(s) occurred just as in the case with one error-correction. 
For example, consider the same field extension as in the previous example, but now 
suppose that Ella receives a message from Noah with two errors instead of one. First, Ella 
computes the two syndromes, S1 and S3, by taking the product of the message and the code 
matrix and splitting it into two pieces. Next, she can plug them into Berlekamp's error-locating 
polynomial. By performing the appropriate linear computations required to find the polynomial's 
roots, taking the reciprocal of the outputs, and comparing the result with the Hamming matrix to 
find the matching columns, the errors can be successfully located. As before, the positions of the 
matching column signal the positions of the message in which errors occurred. The Mathematica 
code for the information transfer follows. 
The associated Hamming Matrix for a double error-correcting matrix is con-
structed using both the successive powers of a and a 3 as defined below. 
a = GabField [ { 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} ] 
MatrixForm[Table[{a"i, (a"i) "3}, {i, 0, 14}]] 
{0 , 1 , 0 , 0}2 
1 1 
{0 , 1 , 0 , Ob {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 b 
{0 , 0 , 1 , 0}2 {1 , 1 , 1 , 1b 
{0 , 0 , 0 , 1h {1 , 0, 1, Ob 
{1, 0 , 0 , 1b {1 , 1 , 0 , 0}2 
{1 , 1 , 0, 1b {1 , 0 , 0 , Oh 
{1 , 1 , 1 , 1h {0 , 0, 0 , 1h 
{1, 1 , 1 , Oh {1 , 1, 1 , 1h 
{0 , 1 , 1 , 1b {1 , 0 , 1 , 0}2 
{1, 0 , 1, Ob {1, 1, 0 , Ob 
{0 , 1 , 0, 1} 2 {1 , 0 , 0 , Oh 
{1 , 0 , 1 , 1} 2 {0 , 0, 0 , 1h 
{1 , 1 , 0 , Ob {1, 1 , 1 , 1} 2 
{0 , 1 , 1, 0}2 {1, 0 , 1 , 0}2 
{0 , 0 , 1 , 1} 2 {1 , 1 , 0 , Oh 
Let DoubleHamming be the associated Hamming matrix. 
DoubleHamming = { { 1 , 0, 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0} , 
{0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1 , 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0}, 
{0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 , 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1}, {0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 
0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1}, {1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}, 
{0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1}, {0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0 , 0, 1, 1, 
0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0}, {0, 1, 1, 0, 0 , 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0}} ; 
MatrixForm[DoubleHamming] 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
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The top four rows of DoubleHamming are the successive powers of a , and the bottom four rows are the 
successive powers of a3 . 
DoubleHammingCode = Reverse [Mod [Null Space [DoubleHamming] , 2] ] ; 
MatrixForm[DoubleHammingCode) 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MatrixForm[Transpose[DoubleHammingCode]] 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 ·0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Define M to be the information digits that Noah wishes to send to Ella. The constructed codeword, 
defined Correct, is precisely the message M with the necessary 8 check digits added to the front. 
M = {1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0} ; 
Correct= Mod[Transpose [DoubleHammingCode) . M, 2) 
{0 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 0 1 1 1 0 , 1 , 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 , 0 , 0} 
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The following functions demonstrate how Noah could generate many codewords in an efficient manner. 
Data= Partition [RandomChoice [ {0 1 1}, 7 * 10] 1 7] 
{{1 1 01 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0} 1 {0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1} 1 {1 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 }1 
{0 , 0 1 11 1 1 0 1 0 1 0} 1 {01 0 , 1 1 1 , 0 1 0 1 0} 1 {0 1 1 1 0 , 0 1 0 1 0 1 1} 1 
{1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 01 0 }1 {1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0} 1 {0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0} 1 {0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1}} 
CheckDigi tGen = Function [x 1 Mod [Transpose [DoubleHammingCode] . x 1 2] ] ; 
Map[CheckDigitGen 1 Data] 
{{0 1 0 , 0 1 0 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 , 1 1 0 1 0} , {1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 0 1 1 , 0 , 0 1 0 1 0 , 1} 1 
{1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 , 1} 1 {0 , 0 1 1 , 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 0 , 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 , 0} , 
{0 1 0 , 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0} 1 {1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1} 1 
{1 , 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 , 0 1 0} 1 {0 1 0 1 0 , 1 , 0 1 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 1 1 1 0 1 0} 1 
{1 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 , 1 1 0} 1 {0 , Q, 1 , 0 1 1 1 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 1 1 1 0 , 1 , 1 1 1 1 1}} 
Suppose Noah intended to send the codeword defined Correct, but instead Ella gets the message 
defined Received. Notice the two errors indicated with underlined digits. 
Correct = { 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} ; 
Received = { 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, l, 0} ; 
Calculating the syndrome 
The syndrome of the correct codeword is the zero vector as anticipated. 
Syndrom = Mod [Doub1eHamming . Correct, 2] 
{0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0 , 0} 
However, the syndrome of the received word is below. 
Syndrom = Mod [Doub1eHamming. Received, 2] 
{1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1} 
The first four digits produce S1, and the second four digits produce S3: 
S1 = GabFie1d [ { 1, 0, 0, 0}) ; 
S3 = GabFie1d [ { 0, 1, 0, 1}) ; 
Let Sigma be the error-locating polynomial of degree 2. 
Sigma[z_] = 1+S1•z+ ((S1A2) + (S3/S1)) •zA2 
1 + z { 1, 0, 0 , 0 }z + z 2 { 1 , 1, 0 , 1 } 2 
The syndromes dictate the coefficients of a quadratic equation. 
a = GabField [ { 1 , 1 , 0 , 1} ] ; 
b = GabField [ { 1 , 0 , 0 , 0} ] ; 
c = GabField [ { 1 , 0 , 0 , 0} ) ; 
{1 , {0 , 0 , 1 , 0} 2 , {1, 0 , 0 , 1} 2 , {1 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 } 
The linear operations defined below solve quadratic equations within binary fields. 
SquaringMatrix = {{1, 0, 1, 1}, {0, 0, 0, 1}, {0, 1, 0, 1}, {0, 0, 1, 1}}; 
MatrixForm[SquaringMatrix] 
1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 
MatrixForm[Inverse[SquaringMatri x, Modulus~ 2]]; 
Mod[Inverse [SquaringMatrix, Modulus~ 2) . {1, 0 , 0 , 1}, 2) 
{0 , 0 , 1 , 0 } 
The computation below checks to make sure the squaring matrix is operating properly. 
GabField [ { 0 , 0 , 1 , 0} ] A 2 
{1, 0 , 0 , 1 }z 
20 
{1, 1 , 0 , 1 }2 
SquareRootMatrix = Mod[SquaringMatrix + IdentityMatrix[4], 2]; 
Output= GabField [LinearSolve [SquareRootMatrix, {1, 1, 0, 1}, Modulus-+ 2]]; 
B1 = (b I a) Output 
B2 = (b I a) (Output+ 1) 
{0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 
{0 , 0 , 1 , 0 }2 
Now 81 and 82 are the reciprocal locations of the errors. 
1 I B1 
{1, 1 , 1 , 0 }2 
1 I B2 
{0 , 1 , 1 , Oh 
Hence, the reciprocal locations are {1 ,1,1,0} and {0 ,1,1,0} which correspond to the eighth and four-
teenth rows of DoubleHamming as designed. 
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While matrix operations are effective, they are not efficient when considering the time 
required for the encoding and decoding process. To make computations more economic, 
elements can be operated on as polynomials within the specified finite field rather than matrices. 
According to Berlekamp' s Theorem 5.31 , all codewords are generated by a single polynomial. In 
order to construct the generating polynomial, a certain product of distinct irreducible 
polynomials in the defined finite field is computed, call it g(x) , and divided out of xn- 1 to 
obtain the polynomial h(x) = ~(~~ where n is the number of digits in the messages. g(x) 
necessarily divides xn- 1 since the roots of the irreducibles are also roots of xn- l. By this 
design, any set of linearly independent multiples of h(x) constructs a code identical to the one 
generated from the associated Hamming matrix. The polynomial operations mimic the matrix 
multiplication executed in the previous examples. The coefficients of the recursion' s highest 
degree polynomial represent the same output as the product of the chosen information and the 
kernel ' s transpose in the matrix context. 
Consider the same field extension I + ~ + x4 over ~ from the previous example. Then, 
g(x) is the product of the minimal polynomials of a and u3 such that 
g(x) = (l +~ +x4 )(1 +x+~ +~ +x4 ) = 1 +x +~ +x4 +x8 and h(x) = x 15-L = 1 +x+x3 +x7 • 
' g(x) 
The recursive relationship between the codewords and the polynomial h(x) can be programmed 
in Mathematica to produce the necessary check digits. The program generates the appropriate 
check digits and concatenates them with the chosen information digits at the front end of the 
output. The vectors formed with the additional check digits correspond with the appropriate 
codewords. 
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Not only can codeword generation be executed using polynomial operations, but the 
error-location process can be optimized as well. In the polynomial context, the two pieces of the 
syndrome, S 1 and S3, are determined by the remainders from the division of a and a 3 ' s 
respective minimal polynomials out of the received message polynomial. The syndromes can 
then be plugged into the error-locating polynomial to successfully identify where the errors 
occurred as before. A Mathematica presentation of generating and correcting the same message 
and syndromes as in the matrix context but with polynomial operations follows. 
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Generating the Syndromes via Polynomials 
The table below shows the irreducible polynomials of the field extension x"4 + .0+1 over Z2 . In particu-
lar, the table reveals the minimal polynomial for a 3 . 
TableForm [{Map [First, FactorList [x" 15- 1, Modulus-+ 2]], 
Map[First, FactorList[x"15 -1, Modulus-+ 2]] I . x-+ a"3}] 
1 
1 
1+X 
{1 , 0 , 0 , 1 b 
1 + x + x 2 1 + x + x 4 
{0 , 1 , 1 , 0} 2 {0 , 1, 0 , 1b 
Let Minimala3 be the minimal polynomial for a3 . 
Minimala3 = X" 4 + X" 3 + X" 2 + X + 1 ; 
1 + x 3 + x 4 
{1, 1 , 1 , Ob 
Let Received Poly be the polynomial representation of the message defined Received. 
ReceivedPoly = x + x"2 + x"3 + x"4 + x"6 + x"7 + x"B + x"9 + x"12 + x"13; 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [ReceivedPoly, Minimala, x, Modulus-+ 2] 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder[ReceivedPoly, Minimala3, x, Modulus-+ 2] 
( a 3 } " 2 + (a " 3) " 3 
{0 , 1 , 0 , 1h 
S1 = 1 ; 
S3 =X+ x"3 ; 
Notice that the polynomials defined S1 and S3 represent the same syndromes as in the matrix context, 
namely {1 ,O,O,Q} and {0, 1 ,0, 1} respectively. 
Generating the Code via Polynomials 
MatrixForm(Double Hamming] 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Let h0-h7 be the polynomial representations of the rows defined by DoubleHamming 
h0 = X A 14 +X A 10 +X A 9 +X A 8 +X A 7 +X A 5 +X A 3 +X A 2 ; 
h1 : X A 13 +X A 9 +X A 8 +X A 7 +X A 6 + X A 4 +X A 2 +X; 
h2 = X A 12 + X A 8 + X A 7 + X A 6 + X A 5 + X A 3 + X + 1 ; 
h3 : X A 11 +X A 10 +X A 9 +X A 8 +X A 6 +X A 4 +X A 3 + 1; 
h4 = X A 14 +X A 12 +X A 11 +X A 10 +X A 9 +X A 7 +X A 6 +X A 5 +X A 4 +X A 2 +X+ 1; 
h5 = X A 12 +X A 10 +X A 7 +X A 5 +X A 2 + 1; 
h6 : X A 12 +X A 11 +X A 7 +X A 6 +X A 2 +X; 
h7 = xA13 + xA12 + xA8 + xA7 +xA3 + xA2 ; 
Now g is the code-generating polynomial. 
g = Minimala * Minimala3 ; 
Expand[g 1 Modulus-+ 2] 
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Notice that the greatest common divisor of the row polynomials h0-h7 matches the polynomial con-
structed by division out of x15 -1 . This is the polynomial h. 
h = PolynomialGCD [hO 1 h1 1 h2 1 h3 1 h4 1 h5 1 h6 1 h7 1 Modulus -+ 2] 
Note that the definiton of polynomials and construction of h can be automated as follows .. 
RowPolynomials = DoubleHamming.Table[x"i 1 {i 1 14 1 0 1 -1}) 
h = PolynomialGCD@@ Join [RowPolynomials 1 {Modulus -+ 2}] 
{ xz + x3 + xs + x 7 + xB + xg + xlo + xl4 I x + xz + x4 + x6 + x 7 + xa + xg + x13 I 
1 + x + x3 + xs + x6 + x 7 + xa + x12 I 1 + x3 + x4 + x6 + xa + x9 + xlO + xll I 
1 + x + xz + x4 + xs + x6 + x 7 + xg + xlo + xll + x12 + xl4 I 1 + xz + xs + x 7 + xlO + x12 I 
x + x: + x6 + x 7 + xll + x12 I x2 + x3 + x 7 + xa + x12 +xu} 
1 + X + X3 + X7 
The function AddCheckDigits below recursievly computes the check digits in an economical manner. It 
takes the input hVector defined by all but the highest coefficient of polynomial h and computes the 
necessary check digits. The check digits are precisely the digits in the output up to the chosen informa-
tion digits. 
hVeCtOr : { 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0} ; 
AddCheckDigi ts = Function [M I MM = M ; 
For [n = 8 1 n > 0 1 n = n- 1; 
MM = Join [{Mod [Take [MM 1 {1 1 7}] . Reverse [hVector] 1 2]} 1 MM]] ; MM] ; 
AddCheckDigi ts [ { 1 I 1 I 0 I 0 I 1 I 0 I 0}] 
{0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0} 
Notice that the first eight digits in the output are the check digits that transform the information defined 
Minto the codeword Correct. 
Correct== AddCheckDigits [ {1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0}] 
True 
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d) N-Error Hamming Codes 
The mathematical basis of successfully locating more than two errors is similar to the 
procedure for correcting two errors; however, more computations are required to find the 
error-locating polynomial of appropriate degree. In the example of a double error-correcting 
code, an error-locating polynomial of degree two was utilized to find the reciprocal locations of 
the errors. The degree two polynomial is just one particular example of an error-locating 
polynomial that can be generated by Berlekamp's algorithm for forming the error-locating 
polynomi_als of binary BCH codes. In order to correct more errors, the recursive algorithm runs 
for a loriger duration and incorporates more variables to produce an error-locating polynomial of 
higher degree. In order to demonstrate the algorithm, the polynomial stated for two 
error-corrections in the previous example will be constructed. 
First, Sis defined as a polynomial in z such that the coefficients are the successive 2N-1 
many syndromes of the received message for N anticipated errors. To constructS, the syndromes 
for odd powers of the root a are computed using either the matrix or polynomial operations 
discussed previously. The even syndromes follow from the computation of the odd syndromes, 
since they are the squares of the preceding syndromes with half of their degree. The base for 
error-locating polynomials of binary codes is defined by a recursive formula with starting values 
cr0 = 1 and 'to= 1 . cr2k represents the error-locating polynomial of degree 2k , and ~ik 
represents the coefficient of z2k+ J in the product (1 + S)cr2k. The successive values of cr and 't 
are recursively generated as follows: 
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2k+2 - ::c;Zk 
T - -;::rt' 
I 
The recursion can be programmed in Mathematica to calculate the cr polynomial with the degree 
required to correct a specified number of errors. In general, a message with Nmany errors 
requires an error-locating polynomial of degreeN. 
For example, consider the same extension over the base field Z 2 by a root of the 
irreducible polynomial 1 + x3 + x4 and the same messages explored previously. The appropriate 
error-locating polynomial is isolated by using a function defined to express the final cr value of 
the recursion as a polynomial in z. 
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Consider the finite field of characteristic 2 with extension by irreducible polyno-
mial I +x3+x4=m(x). 
a = GabField [ { 0 , 1 , 0 , 0}] 
{0 , 1, 0 , 0} 2 
MatrixForm[Tab1e[{i, a"i}, {i, 1, 14}]] 
1 {0 , 1 , 0 , O} z 
2 { 0 , 0 , 1, O}z 
3 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1}z 
4 { 1, 0 , 0 , 1} z 
5 {1 , 1, 0 , 1}z 
6 { 1, 1, 1, 1} z 
7 { 1, 1 , 1 , O} z 
8 { 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }z 
9 { 1, 0, 1, 0} 2 
10 { 0, 1, 0, 1}z 
11 { 1, 0, 1, 1 }z 
12 { 1, 1, 0 , O}z 
13 { 0 , 1 , 1 , O}z 
14 {0 , 0 , 1 , 1} z 
Let OddSyndroms be defined by the syndromes calculated in the previous double error-correcting 
example. The power of alpha was determined by matching the sydrome with its corresponding entry in 
the "logarithm table" above. 
OddSyndroms = {a"11, a"14}; 
S = Function [n, If [OddQ [n] == True , A= OddSyndroms [ [ (n + 1) I 2]] , A = S [n I 2] "2] ; 
A]; 
SP = Table[S[i], {i, 1, 4}] .Table[z"i, {i, 1, 4}] ; 
1 + SP 
Define Deg a function that determines the degree of a polynomial input. · 
Deg =Function [{pol , var}, Length [CoefficientList [pol, var]] - 1]; 
k = 0; 
a= 1; 
t: = 1; 
Whi1e[k < 2, A = Coefficient[ (1 + SP) *a, z" (2 k + 1 )] ; 
PrevSigma = a; 
a = a+A*Z*t: ; 
t: = If[Or[SameQ[A , 0] , Deg[PrevSigma , z] > k], t: = z"2 * t:, t: = z * PrevSigma I A]; 
Print["2k+2= ", 2k+2, ", D(2k+2)= " , Deg[PrevSigma, z], 
",a= ", Expand[a], ", t: = ", Expand[t:], ",A=" , A] ; 
k = k + 1] 
2k+2 = 2 , D(2k+2) = 0, a= 1 + z {1 , 0 , 1, 1h , 1:= z {1 , 0, 0, 1h, 6= {1 , 0, 1 , 1h 
2k+2= 4 , D(2k+2) = 1 , a= 1 + z {1 , 0, 1, 1}2 + z 2 {1, 1 , 1, 1 }2 
, 1:= z {0 , 1 , 1 , 0} 2 + z2 {1 , 0, 1 , 0} 2 , 6= {0 , 0 , L 0} 2 
Expand[a] 
1 + z { 1, 0 , 1 , 1} 2 + z 2 { 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 }z 
Define Errorlocator to be the error-locating output a as a polynomial in the variable x. 
ErrorLocator = Function[x , a I. z-+ x]; 
MatrixForm[Table [ {i, ErrorLocator [1 I a" i]}, { i' 0 ' 14}] l 
0 { 1' 1 , 0 , O}z 
1 { 0 ' 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
2 0 
3 {0 , 1, 1 , 1} 2 
4 0 
5 {1 , 1 ' 0 , O} z 
6 {1 , 1 ' 1 , 1} z 
7 {1 , 1 , 1 , 1}z 
8 {0 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
9 {1 , 0 , 1' 1}z 
10 { 1 1 0 , 0 , 0} 2 
11 {0 , 0 , 1 ' 1} 2 
12 { 0 ' 1 , 1 , 1} z 
13 { 1 ' 0 , 1 , 1} z 
14 { 0 ' 0 , 1 , 1} z 
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The table above displays which reciprical powers of a are roots of Errorlocator. In this, the errors 
occured in in the positions { a2 , a4}, and the second and fourth digits of the message were switched as 
designed. 
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It is important to note that the resultant polynomial, 1 + z{ 1, 0, 1, 1 }z + z2 {I , 1, 1, 1 }z , is the 
same as Berlekamp' s stated formula for finding two errors that is referenced in the correction of 
two errors as desired. 
Now, suppose that a third error is introduced into the received message. Within the field 
extension by 1 + x3 + .0 ' the generating polynomial for a code capable of correcting three errors 
is the product of the three distinct minimal polynomials of a, a3 , and a 5 respectively. 
g(x) = (1 +x3 +x4 )(x4 +x3 +x2 +x+ 1)(1 +x+x2 ) 
In general, for a code to successfully detect errors, the message must have at least as many check 
digits as the degree of the code generating polynomial g(x). Thus, because this particular 
polynomial g(x) has tenth degree, ten check digits are required to successfully detect the three 
possible errors. In this case, a message bearing n= 15 digits has an allotment of five digits for the 
desired information. In fact, the calculated number of five possible chosen information digits 
corresponds with the dimension of the associated matrix' kernel. As presented previously, the 
appropriate check digits can be generated using polynomial computations and added to the 
information to form a codeword. In order for the error-locating algorithm to run as Berlekamp 
intends, the received message needs to be interpreted as coefficients of successive increasing 
powers 0f the chosen field-generating element a . As in the case of two errors, the 
odd-numbered syndromes are the remainders from the division of the irreducible polynomials of 
the respective powers of element a out of the received message polynomial. Since there are three 
errors being detected, cr is required to be a third degree polynomial. Thus, running the recursion 
algorithm program for k < 3 will produce the the necessary polynomial. By design, the roots of 
the error-locating polynomial pinpoint the reciprocal locations of the errors. By evaluating the 
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polynomial for each successive ~ , i E { 0, 1, 2 .... , n- 1} , the errors can be identified in position 
a 2 , a4 , and a 12 as designed. Since the messages are written in binary language, an erroneous 
digit can be corrected by switching it to the opposite value. If a higher number of errors is 
anticipated, the recursive process is simply run for a longer loop with the appropriate value fork 
to account for the greater number of syndromes. The Mathematica program for the correction of 
three errors follows. 
Correction of Three Errors 
Consider the finite field extension over Z 2 by a root of the irreducible 
polynomial I + x3 + x4 = m(x). 
GabField = GF(2 1 {1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1}]; 
Fieldirreducible[GabField 1 x] 
a = GabField [ { 0 1 1 1 0 1 0} ] ; 
In order to correct three errors for a n=15 leng,th message, there can only be 5 chosen information 
digits. This can be seen below since the constructed polynomial g has degree 10. 
Minimal a : 1 + X A 3 + X A 4 ; 
Minimala3 = xA4 + xA3 + x"2 + x + 1; 
Minimala5 = 1 + x + x A 2 ; 
g = Minimala * Minimala3 * Minimala5 ; 
Expand [ g 1 Modulus -+ 2] 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [x A 15 - 1 1 g 1 x 1 Modulus -+ 2] 
hVector = Drop[CoefficientList[h[x] 1 x] 1 -1] ; AddCheckDigits = Function[MI MM = M; 
For [n = 10 1 n > 0 1 n = n- 1; 
MM = Join [{Mod [Take [MM 1 { 1 1 5}] . Reverse [hVector], 2] } I MM]] ; 
MM]; 
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To communicate the message {0, 1 ,0, 1,1 }, the function AddCheckDigits adds the necessary 10 check 
digits to the front of the message. 
AddCheckDigi ts [ { 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1} ] 
{0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 } 
Correct = { 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 0 1 11 0 1 11 1} ; 
Received= {0 1 0 1 Q 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1} ; 
ReceivedPoly : X A 4 +X A 6 +X A 7 +X A 8 +X A 9 +X A 11 +X A 12 +X A 13 +X A 14 ; 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [ReceivedPoly 1 Minimala 1 X 1 Modulus-+ 2] / . x ->a 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [Recei vedPoly 1 Minimala3 1 x 1 Modulus -+ 2] I . x -+ (a A 3) 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [Recei vedPoly 1 Minimala5 1 x, Modulus -+ 2] I . x -+ (a A 5) 
{{1 , 0 1 1 1 Oh 1 {0 1 1 1 1 , 1} 2 } 
{{0 1 0 1 0 1 1 }21 { 1 1 1 1 0 1 0} 2 } 
{ { 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 } 21 0 } 
OddSyndroms = {a"8, a"12, 0} 
{ {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 , {1, 1 , 0 , 0} 2 , 0} 
S = Function[n, If[OddQ[n] ==True, A= OddSyndroms [ [ (n + 1) I 2]], A= S [n I 2] "2]; 
A]; 
SP = Tab1e[S[i], {i, 1, 6}] .Tab1e[z"i, {i, 1, 6}]; 
1 + SP 
1 + z 4 {0 , 0 , 1, Oh + z 2 {0 , 1 , 0 , 0 }2 + z {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 + z 6 {1 , 0 , 1, 0} 2 + z 3 {1 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
Deg = Function [{pol, var}, Length [CoefficientList [pol, var]] - 1] ; 
k = 0; 
a= 1; 
l: = 1; 
While[k < 3, t:. =Coefficient[ (1 + SP) *a, z" (2 k + 1)]; 
PrevSigma = a; 
a=a+t:.•z•t:; 
1: = If[Or[SameQ[t:., 0], Deg[PrevSigma, z] > k], 1: = z"2 * 1:, 1: = z * PrevSigma It:.]; 
Print["2k+2= ", 2k+2, ", D(2k+2)= ", Deg[PrevSigma, z], 
",a=", Expand[a], ", t:= ", Expand[t:], ", t:.= ", t:.]; 
k = k + 1] 
2k+2= 2 , D(2k+2) = 0 , a = 1 + z {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 h , t: = z {1 , 1, 1 , Oh , 6 = {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 h 
2k+2= 4 , D(2k+2) = 1 , a= 1 + z {0 , 1 , 1, 1 h + z 2 {1 , 1 , 0 , 1 h 
, 1: = z {0, 0 , 1 , Oh + z2 {0 , 1, 0, 1 ) 2 , D.= {0 , 1 , 1 , Oh 
2 k + 2 = 6, D ( 2 k + 2) = 2 , a= 1 + z 3 { 0 , 0 , 0, 1} 2 + z { 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 h + z 2 { 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 } 2 
, 1: = z2 {1, 0, 0 , 0} 2 + z3 {1, 1 , 0 , 0 }2 + z {1, 1, 1, 0 ) 2 , 6= {0 , 1 , 1, 1 }2 
Expand[a] 
ErrorLocator = Function [x, a I. z-+ x]; 
1+z3 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 h +z {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 +z 2 {1 , 0 , 0 , 0 }2 
MatrixForm(Tab1e({i., ErrorLocator((l/ (a"i.))]}, {i., 0, 14}]] 
0 {0 , 1 , 1, O} z 
1 { 1 ' 0 , 0 , O} z 
2 0 
3 { 0 , 1 , 0 , 1} z 
4 0 
5 {0 , 1 , 0 , 1 }z 
6 { 0 , 0 , 1 , 1} z 
7 { 0 , 1 , 0 , O}z 
8 {1 , 0 , 0 , 1 }z 
9 { 1 , 0 , 0 , O}z 
1 0 { 1 , 0 , 1 , O}z 
11 { 1, 0 , 1, 1} z 
12 0 
13 { 1 , 1 , 1 , O} z 
1 4 { 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 }z 
By the table above, the errors occured in the third, fifth, and thirteenth positions of the message as 
designed. 
33 
e.) Alternative Method for Error-Location 
While Berlekamp's algorithm for constructing an error-locating polynomial is regarded 
as the most efficient in its implementation, there are other known methods for error-location. 
One alternative method locates the errors by applying the Euclidean algorithm, a simple 
computational procedure (3]. 
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Similar to Berlekamp's method, a polynomials in the variable z is defined such that the 
coefficients of successive powers of z are determined by the successive syndromes of a..i for 
i = 1, 2, 3, ... ,2e-l and e many errors. In particular, the constant of the polynomial begins with 
the syndrome of a. 1• The syndromes can be found using the polynomial computations presented 
thus far. Once s is constructed, it is divided with remainder out of z 2e where e is the number of 
errors that are being corrected. Then, a series of divisions defined by the Euclidean algorithm is 
performed until the degree of the remainder, call it rk , is less than the number of errors e. Once 
the algorithm is complete, the generated multipliers are stripped from the equations to form two 
new series of divisions. These series are equivalent to those used in finding the coefficients a,b in 
the equation rk = a· z2e + b · s where rk is the greatest common divisor of z2e and s. After 
computing the algorithm, the final polynomial remainder corresponds with the coefficient a and 
is a multiple of some polynomial u(z) by scalar A. Similarly, the remainder that corresponds 
with b is a polynomial, call it v, that is a multiple of some polynomiall(z) also by the scalar A. 
Of interest is the fact that the polynomial 1 is proven to be exactly the desired error-locating 
polynomial (3]. Therefore, all that is left to identify the scalar difference A between v and /.In 
fact, since I is designed to have a constant value of 1, A= /(0), and v need only be divided by 
A= /(0) to retrieve the desired error-locating polynomial/. Within the context of binary fields, 
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only the error-locating polynomial is needed since correcting errors amounts to switching a digit 
to its opposite value. Outside ofthe binary context, an error-correcting system is necessary and 
can be constructed using the polynomial w. 
Consider the same message and three errors that were corrected using Berlekamp's 
method in the field extension by 1 + ~ + x4 over the base field Zz . Using the already computed 
odd syndromes { a 8, a 12, 0} , the polynomial s iss= a8 + az + a 12z 2 + a2z 3 + Oz 4 + a9z 5 . For the 
correction of e = 3 errors, the first quotient isz Ze = z 6 . With the base set in place, the Euclidean 
algorithm is computed and programmed in Mathematica. As in the Berlekamp context, the roots 
of the polynomial/ can be used to identify the reciprocal locations ofthe committed errors. 
While the work is not theoretically complex, it is labor-intensive and expensive to run. Even 
though the theory behind the mathematics of the Euclidean algorithm method is valuable in its 
simplicity, its ease is at the expense of its potential to be efficiently implemented. 
Lets be the polynomial defined by the odd sydromes { a8 ,a12,0} 
s = a" 8 + a * z + a" 12 * z "2 + a" 2 * z " 3 + a" 9 * z " 5 
Let e be the number of errors being located. 
e = 3; 
a=z"(2e); 
b = s; 
Q = {}; 
Print ["Modified Euclidean Algorithm: "] 
r = b; 
While[Deg[r, z] ~ e, {q, r} = PolynomialQuotientRemainder[a, b, z] ; 
Q =Append [Q, q]; 
Print[a, "=", q, "*", b, "+", r]; 
a= b; 
b = r]; 
Print [] ; Print ["Modified Extended Euclidean Algorithm: "] 
a=O;b=l; 
While [Not [Q == {} ], q = First [Q] ; 
r=a-q•b; 
Print[Expand[a] , "=", Expand[q], "*(", Expand[b], ")+(", Expand[r], ")"]; 
a= b; 
b = r; 
b = r; 
Q = Drop[Q, 1]] 
Print["Up to a scalar, the error locator polynomial is:"] 
Print [Expand [r]] 
36 
Modified Euclidean Algorithm: 
z 6 =z {1 , 1, 1, 1 h * 
z 3 {0 , 0 , 1, Oh + z {0 , 1 , 0 , Ob + {0 , 1 , 1, 1 h + z 5 {1, 0, 1, Oh + z 2 {1, 1, 0, Oh 
+z 3 {0 , 0, 0, 1 b + z {0, 0 , 1, 1 b + z 4 {0, 1 , 1 , 1 b + z 2 {1 , 1, 1, Ob 
z3 {0 , 0, 1, 0} 2 + z {0 , 1 , 0, Oh + {0, 1, 1, 1 }: + z 5 {1, 0, 1, O)z + z 2 {1, 1, 0, O)z = 
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z (0 , 1 , 0, 0 }2 + {1 , 0 , 1, 1} 2 * z 3 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 }2 + z {0, 0, 1, 1 b + z 4 ( 0, 1, 1, 1h + z 2 ( 1, 1, 1 , Ob 
+Z {0 , 0, 0 , 1 )z + z : {0 , 1 , 0, 1b + z 3 {0, 1, 1, O)z + {0 , 1 , 1 , 1h 
z 3 {0 , 0, 0, 1 h + z {0 , 0, 1, 1 }2 + z 4 {0 , 1 , 1 , 1 }2 + z 2 (1, 1, 1 , 0 }2 =(0, 0 , 1, 1 b + z {0 , 1, 0 , 1} 2 * 
z {0 , 0 , 0, 1 }2 + z 2 {0, 1 , 0 , 1 b + z 3 {0 , 1, 1, 0} 2 + (0, 1, 1 , 1} 2 +z 2 {0, 0, 1 , Ob + {1, 1 , 1, O)z 
Modified Extended Euclidean Algorithm: 
O=z {1, 1 , 1, 1 }2 * (1 ) + (z {1, 1 , 1 , 1 b) 
1=z {0 , 1, 0, O)z + ( 1, 0, 1, 1 lz * ( z {1, 1, 1, 1 h) + (1 + z {0, 0, 1, O)z + z 2 {1, 1 , 1, O}z ) 
z {1 , 1 , 1 , 1 }: ={0, 0, 1, 1 }z + z {0, 1, 0 , 1 lz * (1 + z {0 , 0 , 1 , O)z + z 2 {1 , 1, 1, O)z 
)+(z3 {0, 0, 1, O)z + {0 , 0 , 1 , 1 }z + z 2 {0, 0, 1, 1 b + z {1, 1 , 1 , 0} 2 ) 
Up to a scalar, the error locator polynomial is: 
z 3 {0, 0, 1 , O)z + {0, 0 , 1, 1 }z + z 2 {0, 0 , 1 , 1 h + z {1 , 1, 1, 0} : 
Let R be the remainder of the last programmed division. R corresponds with .AL where Lis the desired 
error-locating polynomial. 
R= z 3 GabField[{O, 0, 1, 0}] +GabField[{O, 0 1 1 1 1}] + 
z 2 * GabField [ { 0 1 0 1 1 1 1} ] + z * GabField [ { 1 1 1 , 1 , 0} ] 
z 3 {0 , 0 1 1, Oh + { 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 h + z 2 {0 , 0 , 1 , 1 }2 + z {1 , 1 , 1 , 0} 2 
The scalar .A in th is example is GabField[{O, 0, 1, 1 }r1 since the desired error-locating polynomial is 
designed to have a constant coefficient of 1. 
L=Expand[R*GabField[{O, 0 , 1 , 1}]"(-1)] 
z 3 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 h + z {0, 1 , 1 , 1}z + {1 , 0 , 0 , 0 }2 + z 2 {1, 0 , 0 , 0} 2 
R= z 3 GabField[{O, 0 , 1, 0}] +GabField[{O, 0 , 1 , 1}] + 
z 2 * GabField [ { 0, 0, 1, 1}] + z * GabField [ { 1, 1, 1 , 0}] 
z 3 {0 , 0 , 1 , O}z + { 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 }2 + z 2 {0 , 0 , 1, 1 h + z {1 , 1 , 1 , O}z 
L=Expand [R*GabField[{O, 0 , 1, 1}]"(-1)] 
z 3 {0 , 0 , 0, 1} 2 + z {0, 1 , 1, 1 }z + {1 , 0 , 0 , O}z + z 2 {1 , 0, 0 , 0 }2 
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f.) Analysis of Code Properties 
Ideally, codes have a relatively high correction rate. In other words, the number of errors 
anticipated before coding failure is a relatively high proportion of the total number of message 
digits. In the given example of three error-corrections, the code has an error-correction rate of 
?5 = 20% and an information rate 155 = 33.3%. If a code with longer message lengths is used 
for the same amount of error-corrections, the greater information rate is at the cost of a lower 
correction rate. For example, a code with messages of digit length 31 designed to correct three 
errors has an information rate of j~ = 51.6% , but it has an error correction rate of {1 = 9.68%. 
Along with the balance of reliability and redundancy, encoders must take the information and 
correct rates into account when designing their optimal code. Thus, it is important to know if all 
field extensions of a particular size produce a code with identical error-correction rates. 
To analyze error-correction rates, first consider all field extensions over Z2 by a fourth 
degree primitive irreducible polynomial such that the field has order 24 - l = 15 . Berlekamp 
proves that all roots of the irreducible polynomial can be represented by successive squares of 
the root a. In this particular example, the roots are a , a2 , a4 , and a 8 , because a16 = a. Further 
then, the roots of the irreducible minimal polynomial fora3 are the respective successive squares 
a 3 , a 6 , a 12 , and a24 = a 9 , because a48 = a3 . The successive process continues until all powers 
of a are exhausted, and in turn, all possible irreducible polynomials of the field extension are 
exhausted. This partition of powers of primitive element a into roots of irreducible polynomials 
holds for field extensions of all orders. Consider the visual representation of the partition: 
39 
Minimal Field Size Field Size Field Size 
Polynomial 24 - 1 = 15 25 -1 = 31 26 -1 = 63 
a 1,2,4,8 1 ,2,4,8, 16 1 ,2,4,8, 16,32 
a3 3,6,12,9 3,6,12,24,17 . 3,6,12,24,48,33 
a s 5,10 5,10,20,9,18 5,10,20,40,17,34 
a7 7,14,13, 11 7,14,28,25 ,19 7,14,28,56,49,35 
a9 9,18,36 
al l 11 ,22, 13,26,21 11 ,22,44,25 ,50,37 
al3 13,26,52,41 , 19,38 
al s 0 15 ,30,29,27,23 15,30,60,57 ,51 ,39 
al 7 
al9 
a21 21,42 
A gap in the middle of the partition table for minimal polynomial a i symbolizes that the 
minimal polynomial of ai is equivalent to a lower power of a ' s minimal polynomial. Hence, 
correcting an additional error in this case does not increase the degree of the generating 
polynomial g(x) , and thus the number of required check digits does not increase. For example, 
when coding messages of size 26 - 1 = 63 , the same number of check digits, namely 45 digits, 
is required to correct 8,9, and 10 errors since the irreducible polynomial for a 17 is the same as 
that for a S, and the irreducible polynomial for a 19 is the same as that for a 13 . Once, all of the 
irreducible polynomials have been accounted for in the groupings, the code is not able to correct 
any additional orders. The limit of error correction can be visualized in the table at the point 
where the irreducible polynomial has root an = a 0 = 1 . 
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The roots of the distinct minimal polynomials group into particular sets of successive 
squares despite there being a specific choice of primitive irreducible polynomial for the field 
extension. The grouping dictates the required number of check digits for any N-error correcting 
code of a given length of this form. For example, to find out how many check digits are needed 
to correct seven errors in a message of length 26 - 1 = 63 , it suffices to determine which of the 
above groups contain the necessary powers of a. , namely { 1 ,3 ,5, 7,9, 11,13}, and add the number 
of total elements in those respective groupings: 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 3 + 6 + 6 = 39 check digits. In 
this, the code has an information rate of ~j = 38% and a correction rate of J3 = 11%. 
Since the correction rates are determined regardless of the choice of primitive irreducible, 
all field extensions of a particular size produce a code with the same error-correction rate. It is 
important, however, to note that not all irreducible polynomials have a primitive element a. that 
generates the field. Therefore, an encoder needs to ensure that the chosen irreducible contains a 
primitive element before generating a code from its field extension. In general, a field of order n 
has q>(n) many primitive roots where <1> is the Euler Phi function. In the case of the field of size 
26 - 1 , there are <!>(63) = 36 many primitive elements. Now, 2 has order 6 modulo 63, and 
further, ORD63(2) = 6 represents the number of successive squares of a chosen root. Thus, the 36 
primitive elements must be divided between 3: = 6 many irreducible polynomials. Therefore, of 
all possible irreducible polynomial extensions of sixth degree, there are only six possible choices 
of primitive codes. 
While codes can still be generated with a non-primitive element, efficiency is lost. 
Consider the example of a code defined by a field extension over the base field Z2 by the 
irreducible polynomial l + x2 + x4 + x5 + x6 . Because a. has order 21 and is not a primitive 
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element, all computations must be done modulo 21 rather than 63. Even though the resultant 
non-primitive code has an information rate of ~i = .57 that is comparable to the information rate 
of primitive degree six extensions, ~~ = .48 , correcting six errors in each block of 63 digits is 
more optimal than correcting two errors in each block of 21 digits, because the six possible 
errors could have been committed in any position of the larger block. A Mathematica 
demonstration of this particular non-primitive code follows. 
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A non-primitive double-error correcting code of length 21 
The cyclotomic binary polynomial Q" is the polynomial with coefficients in Z 2 whose roots are precisely 
the elements of the algebraic closure of Z 2 that have multiplicative order n. In this, the degree of 
O"equals EulerPhi[n]. If a is one such root, then the degree of the irreducible polynomial for a equals 
the multiplicative order of 2 mod n. (See Theorem 4.410 in [1]) For example, if n=21, 
EulerPhi[n]=2*6=12. The order of 2 mod n equals 6: 
EulerPhi[21) 
12 
Table[Mod[2"i, 21], {i, 1, 6}] 
{2 , 4, 8 , 16 , 11 , 1} 
Therefore, cY1 factors into two irreducible polynomials of degree 6. One of them is 1 + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 . 
Start with the irreducible factor 1 + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 of Qn 
MyFie1d = GF[2, {1, 0, 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1}) 
Fieldirreducible[MyField1 x] 
(X : MyFie1d [ { 0 1 11 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0}] 
m1 [x_] = 1 + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 
m1[a) 
GF[2 1 {1 1 0 1 1, 0 1 1 1 1 1 1}] 
{0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 Db 
0 
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The element a has order 21 
TableForm[Table[aAi 1 {il 11 21}]] 
{ 0 1 11 0 1 0 1 0 1 Oh 
{ 0 I 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Oh 
{ 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 Oh 
{0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 Oh 
{ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1}2 
{ 11 0 1 1 1 0 1 11 1}2 
{ 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 11 0} 2 
{0 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 1}2 
{ 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 }2 
{ 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 11 0}2 
{ 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1}2 
{11 0 1 11 1 1 1 1 1}2 
{11 11 11 1 1 0 1 0}2 
{ 0 1 11 11 1 1 1 1 0}2 
{ 0 1 0 1 11 11 1 1 1}2 
{ 1 1 0 1 11 11 0 1 0} 2 
{ 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 11 0}2 
{ 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 11 1}2 
{ 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 0} 2 
{ 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1} 2 
{ 11 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0} 2 
n = 21 
21 
m=6 
6 
2Am-1 
63 
Since n=t=2m-1, the element a is not a generator for the multiplicative group of the field Z 2 (a). So, the 
code below will not be a primitive code. 
Find the irreducible polynomial for aA3 
Since every power of a is a root of xn-1, the irreducible polynomial for a"3 divides xn-1 . It can be found 
by trial and error: 
Table Form [Transpose [{Map [First, FactorList [x" 21 - 1, Modulus -+ 2]] , 
Map[First, FactorList[x"21-1, Modulus-+ 2]] I. x-+ a"3}]] 
1 1 
1 +X { 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , O} z 
1 + x + x 2 { 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 h 
1 + x + x 3 0 
1 + x 2 + x 3 { 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 h 
1 + x + x 2 + x 4 + x 6 {1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1} z 
1 + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 { 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0} 2 
m3[x_] =1+x+x"3 
m3[a"3] 
1 + x + x 3 
0 
The generating polynomial 
g [x_] = Expand [m1 [x] * m3 [x]] 
Encoding 
PolynomialQuotientRemainder [ (x"21-1), g[x], x, Modulus-+ 2] 
hVector =Drop [CoefficientList [h [x], x], -1] ; 
AddCheckDigi ts = Function [M, MM = M; 
For [n = 9, n > 0, n = n- 1; 
MM = Join [{Mod [Take [MM, {1, 12}] .Reverse [hVector], 2]}, MM]] ; 
MM]; 
Ask the random generator to create some sample message: 
Randominteger[1, 12] 
{1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 } 
M= {1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0} 
{1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 } 
Then, add the check digits: 
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Correct = AddCheckDigi ts [M] 
{1 , 0 , 1, 1, 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0} 
Channel error 
Now, create a channel error in two random places. The error-locations are underlined below: 
Received = { 1, 0, Q, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, !., 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0} 
{1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0} 
RR = Received . Table[x"i, {i, 0, 20}] 
R = Function [ z , RR I . x -+ z] ; 
Decoding using Berlekamp's algorithm 
OddSyndroms = {PolynomialRemainder[R[x], m1[x], x, Modulus-+ 2] I . x-+ a:, 
PolynomialRemainder [R [x] , m3 [x] , x, Modulus -+ 2] I. x -+ a:" 3} 
{{0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 }2 , {0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , Oh} 
S =Function [n, If(OddQ [n] ==True, A= OddSyndroms [ [ (n + 1) I 2]], A= S [n I 2] "2]; 
A); 
SP = Table(S(i), {i, 1, 4}].Table[z"i, {i, 1, 4}]; 
1 + SP 
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1 + z {0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1} 2 + z 3 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 + z 2 {0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0} 2 + z 4 {0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 h 
Deg =Function [{pol, var}, Length (CoefficientList [pol, var]] - 1]; 
k = 0; 
0' = 1; 
1: = 1; 
While (k < 2, ll =Coefficient [ (1 + SP) *a, z" (2 k + 1)]; 
PrevSigma = a; 
a=a+ll•z•'l:; 
1: = If(Or(SameQ[Il, 0], Deg[PrevSigma, z] > k], 1: = z"2 * 1:, 1: = z * PrevSigma Ill]; 
Print["2k+2= ", 2k+2, ", D(2k+2)= ", Deg[PrevSigma, z], 
",a=", Expand[a], ", 1:= ", Expand[1:], ", ll= ", ll]; 
k = k + 1] 
2k+2= 2 , D(2k+2 )= 0 , a = 1+Z {0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0 , l h 
, <== z {1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 0)2 , /'; = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1h 
2k+2= 4, D(2k+2) = 1 , a= 1 + z {0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1h + z 2 {1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0) 2 
, <:= z (0, 0, 0 , 1, 0 , Oh + z2 (0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1h , 6= {0 , 0 , 1, 0, 1, 1h 
ErrorLocator = Function [x, a I . z -+ x] ; 
Expand[a] 
1 + z { 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 h + z 2 { 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 0 , 0} 2 
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MatrixForm[Table[ {i, ErrorLocator[ (1 I (aAi))]}, {i,0,20}]] 
0 {0 , 1, 1 , ·1, 0, 1 h 
1 { 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 h 
2 0 
3 {0 , 1, 0 , 1, 1, 0}2 
4 { 1, 1, 0 , 0, 0, 1 h 
5 { 0 , 0, 0 , 1 , 0, Ob 
6 {1 , 0, 0 , 1, 1, 1 h 
7 {0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 }2 
8 { 1, 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , Ob 
9 { 0, 1, 1, 0 , 1, Ob 
10 { 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 , Ob 
11 0 
12 {1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 }2 
13 {0 , 0 , 0, 0, 1 , 1h 
14 {1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 }2 
15 {1, 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 }2 
16 {1 , 1, 1, 0, 1, 0} 2 
17 {1, 0, 0 , 1, 0 , 0}2 
18 {0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1} 2 
19 {0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , Oh 
20 {0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
Comparison to primitive code 
If a primitive irreducible of degree 6 is used, then it is possible to generate a 6-error-correcting code of 
length 26-1 =63 with 5*6+1*3=33 check digits (see equivalence classes of powers of 2 mod 63) and 30 
message digits. While !~ =0.48 and ~~ =0.57 are similar information rates, correcting 6 errors in each 
block of 63 is far superior to correcting 2 errors in each block of 21, because the 6 errors could be 
anywhere. 
47 
Another interesting example of a non-primitive code is the cyclic binary code of length 
23, commonly referred to as the Golay code Q23 . It is designed as a double-error correcting 
code, generated by a primitive 23'd root of unity, call it a, where a and a3 have the same 
irreducible polynomial. However, by Berlekamp' s Corollary 15.27, the distance between any 
two codewords in Q23 is at least 7 digits [1 , p. 359]. Therefore, in Q23, three errors can be 
successfully corrected, but not with the usual fast algorithm presented earlier. For more 
information on the alternative algorithm, see [1 , p. 361]. The generating polynomial, g, for Q23 
has degree 11 , leaving Q23 with an information rate of ~; . Q23 is called a perfect 
3-error-correcting code of length 23, because it fits 2 12 pairwise disjoint spheres with radius 
r = 3 centered at the codewords into a binary alphabet of size 223 without wasting any potential 
space when viewing the code as a metric space with distance measured by the number of errors 
between a potential message and a codeword. In this, 
212 · (C(23, 0) + C(23, 1) + C(23, 2) + C(23, 3)) = 223 where Cis the binomial coefficient. 
While the repetition code consisting ofthe two codewords {0,0,0, ... ,0} and {1 ,1,1, . .. ,1} each of 
length 23 is also termed perfect, it only has information rate 2~ . The set of all binary words of 
length 23 is precisely divided into two spheres, one made up of all codewords with more zeros 
than ones, and the other made up of all codewords with more ones than zeros. 
Another class of perfect codes are the Hamming codes presented earlier. For example, for 
a single-error Hamming code with messages of length 15, there are 11 message digits and 4 
ch~ck digits, forming 211 pairwise disjoint spheres, so that 211 · ( C(15,0) + C(l5, 1) ) = 2 15 . 
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Likewise, for any 3-error correcting code of length n = 15 with k message digits, the 
product 2k · (C(l5, 0) + C(l5, 1) + C(15, 2) + C(l5, 3)) :S 215 , since there are 2k disjoint spheres 
of radius r = 3 to be packed into a binary alphabet of size 2 15 • That is, 2k · 576 :S 2 15 and k :S 5. 
This means that even though alternative methods exists for defining error-correcting codes, there 
is no alternative that will create a message of length n = 15 with more information digits than the 
3-error correcting code presented using Berlekamp' s method. In analyzing the different 
mathematical aspects of binary error-correcting codes, encoders are able to pinpoint the code that 
is most efficient for their goals. 
III. EIGamal Cryptography 
The security of an encryption scheme rests on a mathematical problem that cannot be 
solved or computed quickly given that access to certain secret information is denied. In the case 
of RSA encryption, data is protected by the inefficiency of factoring sufficiently large numbers. 
Similarly, the security ofElGamal encryption, created in 1984 by mathematician Taher EIGamal, 
rests in the inability to efficiently take a logarithm of elements in finite fields; given an element 
in a finite field has been raised to some large unknown power, there is no efficient way to 
discover the power to which the element was raised. Within the set of real numbers, this 
computation is comparable to taking the logarithm of a number; hence, mathematicians term this 
process "the discrete logarithm problem" when operating in any group G. 
Before the public keys are created, the two parties must agree upon a specified group G 
and an element of high order g e G. Each party creates their own private key by selecting one 
exponent, a and b respectively, such that the exponent is relatively large within the specified 
group. With the initial groundwork set, the mathematics behind the encryption and decryption 
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are simple. Encryption occurs with one exponentiation computation, and decryption occurs with 
two. Since the message is required to be an element of G, it is not practical to send detailed data 
in this manner. Instead, the information communicated through ElGamal cryptography is often a 
scrambling code for information rather than the information itself. Even if two channels are 
working to scramble and encrypt information, the information can be read as intended given the 
two channels are scrambling using the same scrambling standard. 
For the cryptosystem to be secure, a finite field needs to be constructed. Given the base 
field ~ , an appropriate field can be achieved through extension by an irreducible polynomial of 
degree higher than 1 ,000. The computations for ElGamal cryptography require a field-generating 
element or an element of large order at the least. Thus, it is important to discern whether a 
particular element has a satisfactory order before encryption can take place. Because all nonzero 
and non-unit elements in a field with prime order are generators, the task of choosing an 
appropriate element can be avoided if the finite field is designed to have prime order. Hence, it 
suffices to extend the base field Z2 by a polynomial that has order p , where MP is a Mersenne 
prime, since the resultant finite field once the zero element is discarded will have prime order 
Mp= (2P-I) . 
For example, consider the finite field extension over the base field Zz by the irreducible 
polynomial 1 + .:J2 + x521 such that the field has prime order M 52 1 = (252 1 - 1). Say that Noah 
and Ella agree upon a random g E G where G is the multiplicative group of non-zero elements 
of the field. Letm , an element in the fieldG, be the desired message, and let a and b be Noah 
and Ella's respective private exponents. Noah and Ella both raise the elementgto their private 
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exponent and publicize the resultant value. Therefore, the public keys become ( G, g , gc') and 
In order for Noah to encrypt his message m, he must take the public value g6 and raise it 
to the power of his private exponent a. It is important to understand that even though the public 
values g6 and g: are denoted in exponential form, Noah and Ella have no knowledge of each 
other's public element's exponent. In fact, that lack of knowledge is the exact phenomenon that 
provides the system's security. Since general exponentiation is an expensive computation, it is 
beneficial to introduce fast exponentiation, a recursive manner of exponentiation. Fast 
exponentiation can be programmed and utilized to make the operations more time efficient. In 
this, Noah' s encrypted message e is computed such that e = m(gh)a . Once Ella receives the 
encrypted message e, she can take the public value go , raise it to the power of her private 
exponent b, and compute the multiplicative inverse call it c. Now, because the computed element 
c is designed to be the inverse of (g6t = (%)6 , multiplying the encrypted message e = megh)a 
by c results in the product of the original message m and the identity element 1. Hence, the 
message is correctly communicated. A Mathematica presentation of an ElGamal transfer 
follows. 
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Let p be the prime p=S21 to construct the Mersenne prime Mp = 252 1 - 1 . 
Let the irreducible polynomial be 1 + x 32 + x 521 such that every nonzero non-unit 
element is a field-generator. 
Field=GF[2, Join[Join[PadRight[{1}. 32]. PadRight[{1}. 489]]. {1}]] ; 
Fieldirreducible[Field, x] 
Let M be the message information 
M = Field[RandomChoice[ {0 , 1}, 521]] 
{1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , :L , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 
0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
·1, 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 
1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 
1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 
1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 
1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0} 2 
Let g be the shared element, and let a and b denote the private exponents. 
g = Field[RandomChoice[{O, 1}, 521]] ; 
a= Randominteger [ {1, 2 "521- 1}] ; 
b = Randominteger[{1, 2"521-1}]; 
FastExp is programemd to make computations in the field more practical and efficient for communica-
tion. 
FastExp =Function [{a, n}, L = IntegerDigits [n , 2]; 
answer= 1; 
s =a; 
While [Not [L == {}] , p = Last [L] ; 
L = Drop [ L, - 1] ; 
If [p == 1, answer = answer * s] ; 
s=s"2] ; 
answer]; 
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Encrypted = M * Fas tExp [ Fas tExp [ g , b) , a) 
{1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 1 , 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 
o, o, o, o, o, 1, 1 , o, 1 , 1 , o, o, 1, o, o·, o, 1, 1, o, o, 1 , o, o, o, 1 , o, o, o, o, 
0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0, 1, 0 , 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 
0 , 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 0, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
1 , 0, 1 , 0, 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 1 , 0 , 0, 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 
0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0 , 0, 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 0 , 0, 1 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1 , 
0 , 1, 0, 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 1 , 1 , 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 
1 , 1, 1, 0 , 1, 0, 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 0, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 1, 0 , 0, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 0, 1, 1, 
0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0, 0 , 1, , 0, 0, 1, 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 
1, 1, 0 , 0 , 0, 1 , 0 , 0, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 , 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1 , 0, 1 , 1 , 0 , 
1 , 0, 0, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 
0 , 0, 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 1, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 
1, 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 
1, 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 1, 0, 0, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 
1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , Ob 
cis the intermediate computation once an encrypted message is received. 
c = (1 I (FastExp[ (FastExp [g, a)), b)}) ; 
Decrypted = Encrypted * c 
{1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 0, 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0, 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 
0 , 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 
0 , 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 1 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
1 , 1, 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 0 , 0 , 0, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
1 , 1 , 0, 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 
1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 
0 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 
1, 1, 0, 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0, 0, 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 1, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1, 1, 
0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0, 1 , 
1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 1 , 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0, 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , ·1 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1 , 1 , 1 , 0, 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0, 0, 0 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 
1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 1, 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1, 1 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 1, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0 , 0 , 1, 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0, 0 , 1 , 1 , 0, 0} 2 
M == Decrypted 
True 
Thus, the decryption is successful. 
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The success ofElGamallies in the complexity of finite field attributes. Elliptic curve 
cryptography embraces this notion and generates sufficiently complicated information transfers 
within the ElGamal format but for a different kind of group G. 
IV. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic curve cryptography is a manifestation of the ElGamal cryptosystem. In particular, 
the public group G is the group defined by the set of points within a finite field that satisfy an 
elliptic curve equation when paired with the operation of coordinate point addition. For an 
elliptic curve in ~2 , coordinate point addition is defined geometrically by computing the third 
point where the line through two distinct chosen points (or tangent if they are equal) hits the given 
elliptic curve and finding its reflection about the x-axis (here, a point at infinity is added for 
consistency). While the geometry changes when working within a finite field , the mathematics 
behind the computations is comparable besides a few additional cases. For a thorough 
presentation of the group operation, see [19]. Now, raising an element of the group to a particular 
exponentn is computed by adding the point to itself n times. While the mathematical theory 
behind the encryption and decryption is adjusted to accommodate the chosen group ' s 
construction, the method of communication is the same as in the standard ElGamal system. Even 
though the concept of elliptic curve cryptography was first introduced in 1985 by Neal Koblitz 
and Victor S. Miller, the efficiency and application of the cryptosystem remain active fields of 
research as those in the data security industry attempt to prepare for post-quantum computing. 
Before encryption and decryption can begin, it is necessary to select a finite field with an 
appropriate prime order and elliptic equation to generate a secure group G. For optimal security 
and efficiency, it is important to choose the elliptic equation and prime size wisely. The security 
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of a finite field of order p is determined by the length of its binary expansion since the messages 
are ultimately translated and encoded in binary language. Currently, the government 
recommends that all binary fields have at leastm=163, and analysis has been conducted on 
increasing levels of security up tom=571. For example, whenm=283, the binary expansion has 
length of256, resulting in security for bit lengthn=256. At the lowest levelm=163, the 
expansion has length 192, and messages requires a bit length n E [161-223] [9, Appendix 0]. 
Once the prime p has been chosen, the elliptic curve equation can be defined. While there have 
been algorithms developed to pseudo-randomly generate sufficient curves, the generated curves 
may or may not foster efficient field computations. By Hasse 's Theorem [13] , the number of 
points in the elliptic curve group is roughly the same as the prime p.Traditional elliptic curves 
are defined by an equation of form y2 = x3 +ax+ b. 
For example, consider the curve y2 = x3 - 3x + 121243 which has been designed to be 
efficient by mathematicians Bos eta!. This curve is termed a Weierstrass curve which have been 
proven to "give full ECDLP[elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem] security over prime 
fields of a fixed bit length, while offering good practical performance" [5]. For the security 
level of256 bits, the prime pis selected as a pseudo-Mersenne prime of the formp = 2512 -569, 
where 569 is the smallest positive integer such that p is prime and 512 = 2 · 256 optimizes the 
security of the given bit length [5, p. 5]. By construction, the prime p = 3 mod 4. This property is 
desirable since a formula exists that is capable of computing the quadratic residues of primes of 
form p = 3 mod 4, a necessary computation to determine the points that satisfy the chosen 
elliptic curve equation. Once the prime is chosen, the coefficient a = - 3 is fixed, and the value 
b = 121243 is determined to be smallest positive value such that both the group defined by the 
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points on the elliptic curve and the group defined by the points on the elliptic curve's quadratic 
twist have prime order. If the curve has form y 2 = x3 - 3x + b , then its quadratic twist is defined 
as y 2 = x3 - 3x- b. Setting bin this manner ensures heightened resistance against Pollard's 
p-method of factorization through the control of the curve's trace, which in tum measures the 
complexity and security of the cryptosystem. Also, since the group of points on the elliptic curve 
is constructed to have prime order, all points within the group must be primitive elements. 
Therefore, any random point within the group has an order capable of producing effective 
communication. 
This freedom in choosing points deems groups of elliptic curves with prime order an 
important field of research. In 1988, Koblitz presented that the number of primes p :S n for some 
n such that group order of the points on a given elliptic curve E is prime is asymptotic to 
C En/(log n)2 where C E is a constant that depends on the curve E [12]. The probability and 
possibility of selecting elements bearing high order in non-prime fields, either randomly or 
intentionally, is a vast field of research that is still open and being researched today. 
With a sufficient curve in place, the communication can be safely carried out as in the 
ElGamal system. Given that G is defined as the points satisfying the chosen elliptic curve, a 
point on the curve R is chosen as the public key component such that R=(xR,yR) for integers 
xR,yR. In order to construct the two asymmetric ElGamal keys, two private exponents are 
chosen. The public keys become (G, R, Rr) and (G, R, R') where rand tare the chosen 
exponents, and the respective private keys become (G, R, r) and (G, R, t). It is important to note 
that since M is necessarily an element of the group G itself, the communicated messages are 
often unscrambling codes rather than direct information just as in the original ElGamal format. 
Also, while the notation appears multiplicative, all operations are defined by the arithmetic of 
adding points within finite fields. Consider that Noah and Ella agree upon the curve 
y = ~ - 3x + 121243 mod 2512 - 569. A standard transfer in Mathematica code follows. 
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Consider the finite field Zp for p defined below. Define the elliptic curve equation 
y2 = x3 - 3 x + 121 24 3. 
p = 2 ... 512 - 569 ; 
a= -3; 
b = 121243; 
Mod[p, 4] 
3 
The following computations demonstrate the validity of the constructed group's prime order as stated 
in reference [5] . 
trace= Interpreter [ "Hexinteger"] [ 
"A4C35B046B187CE4B03DA712682F4239C4A974C99F832DBC31EACOC6FBCCA86B"] 
74 524 470 523 323 306179 098 763 612 522 339 584 975 451401095 028 492149 363 970 074 628. 
368 4 91 
GroupOrd = p + 1 - trace 
13 407 807 929 942 597 099 574 024 998 205 846127 479 365 820 592 393 377 723 561443 721764. 
030 073 472 452 331350 974 860 724 328 926 419 335 846 901075 402 352 787 783 454 420 582 463 ·. 
574 377 715 037 
PrimeQ[GroupOrd] 
True 
N[GroupOrd /p , 100] 
0.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999944 ~ 
4171106024768598503886 
If the chosen curve was defined over the real line, it would appear as depicted on the graph below. 
f[x_] := xA3+a•x+b; 
F[x_, y_] = f[x] -yA2 
ContourPlot[F[x, y] ==0, {x, -122, 122}, {y, -512, 512}, Axes-+True, Frame-+False] 
Solve [f [x] == 0, x] 
12 1 2 4 3 - 3 x + x 3 - y 2 
-100 - 0 50 100 
- 200 
- 400 
( . ) l/3 - ( ~ { {x ~ - 121243- -J 1: 699 865 045 ) l/ 3 (121 243--J1 4699 865045) } , 
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{ 1 (1 )l/3 1 - i-/3 } , X ~ 2 (1+i-/3) 2 (121243--J14 699865045) + -------------
2213 (121243--J14699865045 ) 113 
{ 1 ( 1 )l/3 1+i-!3 }} X~ 2 (1- i -13 ) 2 (1 21 243- -J14 699 865 045) + ----------- --
2213 (121243 - -J14699865045 ) 113 
To visualize a discrete elliptic curve against the real line, consider the graph below. A different curve 
and field is used to present the comparison in order to have a clear depiction of points. 
q = NextPrime [256] 
f [x_ ] : X A 3 + 5 X+ 4 
F[x_, y_1 = yA2 - f [ x ]; 
P=Tuples[Range[q1-1, 21 ; 
G = Select[P, Mod[F[U[ [1]], U[ [2] 1] , q] == 0 &1 ; 
Length[G] 
ListPlot [G, PlotStyle -> {Red , Poi ntSize [Large]} 1 
257 
4 + 5 X+ x 3 
247 
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Let R be the shared group element for the EIGamal public key. In this example, R is constructed by 
adding two distinct points on the curve, P and Q. 
xP = Randominteger [ {0 1 p -1}] 
4 518 328 55 1 884 945170 266 978 977 65 2 761309 679 035 611409195168 783150 456 361824 335 ·. 
097 558 423 423 725 831410 460 583 666 049 7 44 244 603 012 971109 379 440 478 079 088 549 853 
591272 040 
yP = PowerMod[f[xP] 1 1 I 2 1 p] 
4 746 400 305 870 961 8 4 0 775 362 325 306 215 683 406 318 755 000 227 086 592 987 1 47 069 445 236. 
019 912 511198 351288 015 682 040 088 546 371765 496 657 716 230 379 030 272 862 489 301630 . 
044 308 843 
xQ = Randominteger [ {0 1 p- 1}] 
13164 266 329 331700 341 7 34 106 526145 899 745 822 685 375 576 648 961 598 493 87 1 022 0 1 6 · .. 
238 58 4 008 672 120 428 734 73014 7 011269 626 4 76 367 213 256 342 857 432 408 356186 8 4 1 602 . 
079 706 602 415 
yQ = PowerMod[f[xQ] 1 1 I 2 1 p] 
3 1 74 438 751826 3 1 9 826 045 871123 93 2 712 305 390 637 654 314 269 808 404 617 208 488 484 133 ·. 
300 434164 975137 986 522 966 013 847 327 312100 247 039 660 753 280 615 811337 759 1 74 79 1 · 
521243 693 
,., 
For this example , p:3 mod 4 , so the command PowerMod only has to calculate x 4 to find the square 
root of x mod p. If instead p:1 mod 4 , then an additional algorithm, while efficient, is required to com-
pute the quadratic residue as discussed in my previous Math 416 class. 
P = {xP, yP} 
Q = {xQ, yQ} 
60 
{ 4 5 1 8 328 551 884 945170 266 978 977 652 761 309 679 035 611 409195168 783150 456 361824 
335 0 97 558 4 2 3 4 2 3 7 2 58 3 1 410 4 60 583 666 04 9 7 4 4 24 4 603 0 1 2 971 10 9 3 7 9 4 4 0 4 7 8 07 9 088 ·. 
549 853 591272 040 , 
4 7 4 6 4 00 305 8 7 0 9 61 84 0 77 53 62 325 30 6 215 683 4 06 318 7 55 000 22 7 08 6 5 92 98 7 14 7 0 69 4 4 5 . 
236 019 912 511198 351288 015 682 040 088 546 371765 496 657 716230 379 030 272 862 489 ·. 
301630 044 308 843} 
{13164 266 329 331700 341734106 526145 899 745 822 685 375 576 648 961598 493 871022 016 · .. 
238 584 008 672120 428 734 730147 011269 626 476 367 213 256 342 857 432 408 356186 841 . 
602 079 706 602 415 , 
3174 438 751826 319 826 045 871123 932 712 305 390 637 654 3 1 4 269 808 404 617 208 488 484. 
133 300 434 164 975137 986 522 966 013 847 327 312100 24 7 039 660 753 280 615 811 337 759 . 
174 791521243 693} 
The function AddingPoints executes the group operation, namely addition of points on the elliptic curve. 
AddingPoints =Function [ {P, Q}, If [SameQ [P, m), Answer = Q) ; 
If[SameQ[Q, m) , Answer= P) ; 
If[And[Not[SameQ[P, m)], Not[SameQ[Q , m]]], {xP, yP} = P; 
{xQ, yQ} = Q ; 
Which[Not[Or[And[xP == xQ, yP == yQ] , And[xP == xQ, Mod[yP +yQ, p] == 0]]], 
s =Mod[ (yP- yQ) * PowerMod[xP- xQ, -1, p], p] ; 
xR = Mod [ ( s "2 - xP- xQ) , p] ; 
yR =Mod [ -yP + s (xP- xR) , p); 
Answer= {xR , yR}, And[xP == xQ , Mod[yP + yQ , p) == 0], Answer= m, 
And[xP==xQ , yP==yQ], s=Mod[(3• (xP"2) + a) •PowerMod[2•yP, -1, p], p); 
xR = Mod [ s " 2 - 2 * xP , p] ; 
yR=Mod[-yP+s (xP-xR), p]; 
Answer = {xR , yR}]] ; Answer] ; 
R = AddingPoints [P , Q) 
{215 026 167 209 224 793 320 023 397 797 974 308 178 721 283 099 845 538 912 390 586 695 742 984 ·. 
7 3 9 7 58 4 72 558 661 6 93 54 2 3 93 17 3 7 81 4 30 685 04 8 57 2 677 02 8 2 69 030 619 537 835 814 4 63 ·. 
299660553072 , 
5 502 461983 872 835 852 775 428 948 904 746180 202 618 658 404 573 510151548 367 616 853 ·. 
70 1864 882 719 661719 078 397 570 211781349 505 585 049 277 636 866 288 422169 711339. 
000 022 967 586 738} 
The function FastExpAdd repeatedly adds a point to itself n-many times. 
FastExpAdd = Function [ {P, n}, L = IntegerDigits [n, 2]; 
answer = co ; 
q = p; 
While[Not[L == {}], w = Last[L]; 
L = Drop[L, -1]; 
If [w == 1, answer = AddingPoints [answer, q]] ; 
q = AddingPoints [q, q]]; 
answer]; 
Let t and r be the randomly chosen private key exponents. 
t = Randominteger [ {1, p -1}]; 
r = Randominteger [ {1, p- 1}]; 
61 
Define Info as the desired message consisting of 100 binary information digits. Info is mapped into the 
x-coordinate of a point on the elliptic curve. 
Info= {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1 , 1 , 1, 
0, 1, 0, 0, 0 , 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 
1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0 , 1, 0, 
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} ; 
Extra digits are added to the end of the x-coordinate binary message to satisfy the condition that the 
point is on the curve. Call the constructed point M . 
xM = FromDigits[Join[Info, {1, 0, 1 , 0, 0}], 2]; 
yM = PowerMod [f [xM], 1 I 2, p] ; 
M = {xM, yM} 
{23 650 956 938 657134 206 802 555 216 564 , 
1722 776 345 872 171 659 858 732 879 421104 300 376 843 567 898 554 365 362 986 607 738 793 ·. 
309 44 1 015 252 381188 746 995 642 829 94 8 522 034 971998 387 7 4 6 1 73 448 848 038 925 510 ·. 
039161914 690 985} 
Rt = FastExpAdd [R, t] ; 
Rr = FastExpAdd [R, r] ; 
Encrypted = AddingPoints [M, FastExpAdd [Rt, r]] 
{ 11 4 77 2 65 4 8 3 7 8 0 68 6 2 90 67 0 920 300 07 8 4 92 008 219 722 821 553 7 4 2 4 01 0 90 4 4 9 2 0 9 919 7 52 
816154161927 976117 864 552 035 258 497 440 520 853137 445 420 735 874 726177 707 291 . 
208 029 068 718 894 , 
5 602102 786 499 023 214 275 768 206 024 291978183 975 329177 630 462 355 029 562 470 636 ·. 
125 695 244 486 428 216 416125 633 683 535 926 504 538 390 580114 067 423 000 394 330176. 
139 046286331 077} 
{xRrt, yRrt} = FastExpAdd[Rr, t] 
{12 496 396 271096 868 819 751012 005 605 618 303 477 367 419 492 374 994 268123 220 413 565 ·. 
926 918 574 976 748 081015 431228 011638168 809 202170 498 4711 69158 309 396 447177. 
752046888676052 , 
1902 622 412 004 097 980 777 057 697 204 298 811541416 743 864 727119197174 454 225 852. 
271 355 612 57 5 4 90 8 96 8 7 9 2 98 665 4 32 812 4 53 172 321 4 66 2 66 672 8 55 504 17 9 67 8 601 671 . 
029156 782 787 107} 
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Decrypted= AddingPoints [Encrypted, {xRrt, -yRrt}] 
{23 650 956 938 657 134 206 802 555 216 564 ' 
1 722 776 3 4 5 872171659 858 732 879 42 1 104 300 376 843 5 67 898 554 365 362 986 607 738 7 93 · .. 
309 44 1 0 15 252 381188 746 995 642 829 948 522 034 971998 387 746173 448 848 038 925 510. 
0 3 9 161914 6 90 985} 
M == Decrypted 
True 
Output = IntegerDigi ts [Part [Decrypted, 1] ' 2] 
{ 1' 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1' 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 ' 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 ' 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 0 , 0, 1 , 1' 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 
1 , 0 , 1, 0, 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 ' 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 ' 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 
0 , 1 , 0, 1 , 0 , 1 ' 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 ' 0 , 1 , 0 , 1' 0 , 0 , 0, 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0} 
After translating the decrypted message back into binary langauage, the first 1 00 digits correspond to 
the original 100 digits of the desired message. 
Info== Take [Output , 100] 
True 
Thus, the decryption is successful. 
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V. Conclusion 
As data continues to support the backbone of society, it is crucial that data is protected in 
the most secure yet efficient manner possible. Modem cryptography is caught in a transitional 
period as governments, companies, and individuals alike fight to keep up with the increasing 
speed of technology and prepare for a revolutionary quantum age. Researchers are adapting, 
innovating, and producing new ideas in order to ensure that the security of our society, so 
heavily rooted in data, is preserved. The data breach of Carte Bleue and the chip card ban in 
Estonia demonstrate this dire need. As the computational power of technology increases, the bit 
length of key sizes needs to increase as well. When comparing the encryption power of varying 
key lengths between the RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystem, it follows that elliptic curve 
cryptography requires smaller key sizes for parallel levels of standard security. 
Even though studies done by the mathematician Okeyinka show that RSA cryptography 
is more energy-efficient overall, ElGamal cryptography is more efficient when only considering 
the decryption procedure. In particular, given a text length of 18,580 characters, decryption 
requires 111 .9454 milliseconds and 162.4227 milliseconds for E1Gama1 and RSA respectively 
[18]. Both methods, while swelled in magnitude, will continue to operate as long as quantum 
technology fails to emerge. Thus, Okeyinka concludes that combining the best qualities of each 
system results in the most economic system yet; however, he does not take quantum technology 
into consideration. Unfortunately, in the realm of quantum technology, the same Shor' s 
Algorithm that can deteriorate an RSA system also has the potential to crumble the elliptic curve 
cryptosystem. For a deeper look into Shor' s Algorithm, refer to Lowe's article [16]. Fortunately, 
there are cryptosystems rooted in the foundations of ElGamal and ultimately elliptic curve 
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cryptography emerging on the horizon that are designed to be quantum technology resistant. The 
mathematician Hecht states that one particular generalization of ElGamal cryptography has the 
ability to maintain security in spite of quantum computing. His argument is especially appealing 
to cryptographers as all computations remain secure within the finite field Z251 , a relatively 
small field within the cybersecurity context [11]. The supposed cryptosystem works within the 
general linear multiplicative subgroup over prime field F 251 , denoted GL(d, F 251). where d is 
the order of a square matrix within the subgroup. 
Researchers Li, Higgins, and Clement out of Brigham Young University compare the 
speed of transfers in both the original and elliptic curve version of the ElGamal method for finite 
fields of bit lengths 768 and l 024. They state that for parallel levels of security, the elliptic curve 
version ofElGamal can be executed over 50 times faster than the standard ElGamal system [15]. 
Further, mathematicians have developed a slight modification ofthe current elliptic curve 
method that also has the potential to withstand quantum attacks and the computing power of 
Shor's Algorithm. The concept is based on isogenies, rational maps between curves with equal 
order, of supersingular curves. Supersingular curves, by definition, have p ± 1 points such that no 
points have order p where pis the prime that defines the finite field [22]. Since this adaptation 
was only first proposed in 20 14, researchers are still working to determine its level of security 
and efficiency. While there is still much to learn, the amount of explorable properties of elliptic 
curves, and supersingular curves in particular, hold great potential for future cryptosystems. 
As computing speeds quicken and society progresses into the quantum age of 
technology, cryptosystems need to evolve in order to maintain security. The current predominate 
encryption method, RSA cryptography, is not equipped to adapt to the changing tides of 
technology. 
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Even if the key sizes are continually increased, the cost of the necessary computing 
power is not practical to uphold. Corporations and individuals alike must tum towards finite 
fields to ensure the safety of their information. The mathematical structure of finite fields 
produces encryption methods that have the potential to keep data secure alongside the 
progression of technology. ElGamal and elliptic curve cryptosystems are both active areas of 
research that offer hopeful alternatives to the current RSA system. Further, the error-correcting 
codes that are defined within binary finite fields protect the transmission of all data, whether it be 
encrypted or not. Without error-correcting codes, the work put into cleverly encrypting data can 
be quickly undone during transmission. Beyond the protection of sensitive information, error-
correcting codes are utilized for many everyday tasks such as making a cup of coffee with a 
Nespresso machine, scanning QR codes with cell phones, saving files on computers, and 
listening to CD players on bumpy car rides. Postmodem society cannot afford to lose either 
security or efficiency, and the mathematical properties of finite fields and elliptic curves offer 
insight into what society needs to keep the peace. 
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